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Abstract
Previous to 1970, state and federal agencies held exclusive enforcement
responsibilities over the violation of pollution control standards. However,
recognizing that the government had neither the time nor resources to
provide full enforcement, Congress created citizen suits.
Citizen suits, first amended to the Clean Air Act in 1970, authorize
citizens to act as private attorney generals and to sue polluters for violating
the terms of their operating permits. Since that time, Congress has included
citizen suits in 13 other federal statutes.
The citizen suit phenomenon is sufficiently new that little is known
about it. However, we do know that citizen suits have increased rapidly since
the early 1980·s. Between 1982 and 1986 the number of citizen suits jumped
from 41 to 266. Obviously, they are becoming a widely used method of
enforcing the environmental statutes.
This paper will provide a detailed description, analysis and evaluation
of citizen suits. It will begin with an introduction and will then move on to
provide some historic and descriptive background on such issues as how
citizen suit powers are delegated, what limitations are placed on the citizens,
what parties are on each side of the suit, what citizens can enforce against, and
the types of remedies available.
The following section of the paper will provide an economic analysis
of citizen suits. It will begin with a discussion of non-profit organizations,
especially non-profit environmental organizations, detailing the economic
factors which instigate their creation and activities. Three models will be
developed to investigate the evolution and effects of citizen suits. The first
model will provide an analysis of the demand for citizen suits from the point

of view of a potential litigator showing how varying remedies, limitations
and reimbursement procedures can effect both the level and types of activities
undertaken. The second model shows how firm behavior could be expected
to respond to citizen suits. Finally, a third model will look specifically at the
issue of efficiency to determine whether the introduction of citizen
enforcement leads to greater or lesser economic efficiency in pollution
control.
The database on which the analysis rests consists of 1205 cases compiled
by the author. For the purposes of this project this list of citizen suit cases and
their attributes were computerized and used to test a series of hypotheses
derived from three original economic models. The database includes
information regarding plaintiffs, defendants date notice and/or complaint
was filed and statutes involved in the claim. The analysis focuses on six
federal environmental statutes (Clean Water Act} Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, and Safe Drinking
Water Act) because the majority of citizen suits have occurred under these
statutes.
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I. INTRODUCfION

The Issue
The degree to which environmental quality is improved by public
policy depends not only on the types of policies, but also on how well those
policies are enforced. Policies which seem to offer promise may, in the glare
of hindsight, prove unsuitable if enforcement is difficult or lax.
Economists have historically not paid much attention to enforcement,
concentrating instead on the choice of policy instruments. 1 Economists have
focussed on developing efficient pollution control policies and regulations
which attempt to hannonize public and private costs and benefits. While this
literature has spawned a number of new insights and has paved the way for a
new approach to pollution control policy,2 it has not paid attention to the role
of the courts in proportion to their importance.3
Prior to 1970, state and federal agencies held exclusive enforcement
responsibility.

However, in 1970, while amending the Clean Air Act4,

Congress authorized private citizens to sue polluters for violating the tenns
of their operating pennits. The birth of citizen suits was upon us and
environmental enforcement was no longer purely the responsibility of the

~ For a description of this literature see P.Bohm and C. Russell, "Comparative Analysis of
Alternative Policy Instruments" in A.V. Kneese and J.L. Sweeney, ed.s. Handbook of Natural
Resource and Energy Economics vol.1 (Amsterdam; North-Holland,. 1985); 395-460.
2 This is described in detail in T.H. Tietenbe.rg. "&onomic Instnunents for Environmental
Regulation" Oxford Review ofEconomic Policy, vol. 6., no.1 (March, 1990):17-33.
3Oneimportant exception is Clifford Russell, Winston Harrington and William J. Vaughan,
Enforcing P-oDutlon Control Laws (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, lnc.1986).
41 Section 304, 42 US.c. 7604
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government. Since that time a number of other federal statutes have
incorporated citizen suit provisions crable 0,
The citizen suit phenomenon is sufficiently new that little is known
about it. What detennines the amount of litigative activity? What are the
consequences of these suits? Where do they fit in the overall fabric of
environmental policy? These questions fonn the focus for this project.

Table I: Acts AuthorizjnS Cjtizen Suits
Clean Air Act (eM)
Oean Water Act (CWA)
Marine Protection, Research
and Sanctuaries Act (M PRSA)
Noise Control Act (NCA)
Endangered Species Act (E$A)
Deepwater Port Act (DPA)
Resource Conservation and
Recovel)' Act (RCM)
Toxic Substances Control Act mCA)

Section 304, 42 US.c. 7604
Section 505,33 U S.c. 1365
Section 105(G), 33 US.c. 1415(g)
Section 12-42 US.C.4911
Section 11(g), 16 U.s.c. 1540(g)
Section 16,33 US.c. 1515.
Section 7002, 42 US.c. 6972
Section 20,15 US.c. 2619
Section 1449, 42 U.s.c. 3OOj-8

Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
Surlace Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA)
Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OSCI.A)
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and
Uability Act (CERClA)amended
bySupe1fundAmendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA)
Emerge1C)' Planning and Conununity
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
Hazardous Uquid Pipeline Safety Act

Section 520,30 U S.c. 1270
Section 23,42 US.c. 1349(a)

Section 310, 42 US.C. 9659
Section 326, 42 US.c. 11046
Section 215,49 US.c. 2014

(Source: BonneyCashin" "Keys to Successful Lawsuits: Recommendations {or Private Dtizen
Enforcement". (Un ublished a r14-S.)
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Background
Most citizen suit provisions have been modeled after Section 304 of the
Clean Air Act. The relevant portion of this section states that:

",..any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf
1) against any person including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency who is alleged to be in
violation of A) an emission standard or limitation or B) an order
issued by the Administrator or State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, 2) against the Administrator where there
is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perfonn any act or
duty, 3) against any person who proposes to construct or
constructs any new or modified major emitting facility without
a penn it. "5
Empowered as private attorney generals" citizens are authorized to
oversee government actions and to initiate civil proceedings against any
private or public polluter violating the terms of its pollution pennit. For the
conditions of the statute "any person/} is defined as an "individual,
corporation" partnership, association, state, municipality, political subdivision
of a state and any agency depamnent or instrumentality of the U.s. or any
officer, agent or employee thereof."6 Under most citizen suit provisions
corporate officers, owners and/or employers are not civilly liable for
violations, the corporation itself is liable. 7
The recognition that the govemment did not have enough resources
to enforce all environmental standards was a main reason for creating citizen
suits.

According to Mark Stein at EPA, such suits are an important

enforcement mechanism.
5 Section 304, 42 U.s.C. 7604
6, Adeeb Fad.iL "Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking up the Pace" HaIVard Environmental
Law Revi~ 9 no. 1 (1985): 30-31.
7 BonneyCashin, "Keys to Successful Lawsuits: Recommendations for Private Citi.2en
Enforcement" (Unpublished paper), 11.
3

"Citizen suits are great" there's a lot more out there that needs to
be enForced and citizens can also keep the pressure on the
regulated community"B
Although the details about citizen suits vary with each statute, all provide the
same basic powers with the same general goal in mind.
Public environmental enforcement can occur through a number of
avenues. At the federal level, enforcement occurs through administrative
proceedings, or through civil and criminal judicial action.
Administrative action occurs in the Administrative Courts of the
Environmental Protection Agency and is presided over by Administrative
Law Judges. Administrative actions usually involve the imposition of a civil
penalty, the creation of a compliance order, or both.9 Cases can frequently be
settled far more quickly and agreeably by administrative action than by going
to court. The majority of EPA enforcement activities involve administrative
proceedings; in 1988 alone EPA initiated 3,085 administrative actions which
represented approximately 88% of the enforcement activity.IO Successful
negotiation between EPA and the violator produces a consent decree, which
creates compliance schedules and/or provides for the collection of civil
penalties. Civil penalties are calculated to recover the economic benefit
received by the violators in failing to comply with environmental standards.
Judicial action is a second avenue through which EPA can proceed.
They do so by investigating and refening violations to the U.S. Attorney
General for civil or criminal enforcement.

Civil action involves the

8 Mark Stein, intetview by author, Water Enforcement - Environmental Protection Agency
Region I, Boston,.. Massachusetts, December6, 1989.
9 Michael J. Walker, "High Stakes on a Fast Track.: Administrative Enforcement at EPA"
Federal Bar News & Joumal" 35 no. 10 (Oec.I988): 454.
10 United States Environmental Protection Agency, FY 1988 EnforrementA,cc,mplishments
Report. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988). 2-5.
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imposition of penalties and/or injunctions, while criminal action involves
even higher financial penalties and/or jail sentences directed at those people
within organizations who are willfully polluting.

Consistent with the

presumption of innocence, the burden of proof faced by the Attorney General
is higher for securing a criminal conviction than for imposing civil remedies.
In 1988 EPA made 372 civil referrals to the Department of Justice and 59
criminal referrals yielding judicial enforcement 12% of the time. l l
State environmental agencies share enforcement power with EPA.
States often enact environmental laws similar to the federal statutes and
become authorized by EPA to enforce federal statutes as well. State
enforcement activities are much the same as those which occur at the federal
level. A large portion of the state cases are also settled by means of
administrative consent agreements.1 2 These differ slightly from their
counterpart, federal consent decrees, in that state decrees do not involve a
judge. Violation of a federal consent decree means violation of a court order,
while violation of a state consent agreement means violation of an
administrative order. Nationally, state environmental agencies issued 9,363
administrative orders in 1988, thus rendering administrative action 91% of
the time.1 3 George Lord, of the Maine Department of Environmental
Enforcement, stated that 85-87% of the cases in Maine are settled by means of
administrative consent agreements.1 4 On the other hand, states made only
904 judicial referrals to the Deparbnents of Justice in their respective areas.
United States &virorunental Protection Agency, FY1988EnForcementAa:omplishments
R'eport. (VVashington, D.C.: GPO, 1988),2-5.
12 State agencies can also make civil referrals to state attorney generals and some states have
begun providing for crintinal enforcement as weD.
B United States Environmental Protection Agency, fiY 1988 HnforcernentAccomplishments
Report. (VVashington" D.C.: GPO, 1988),2-5.
14 George Lord, interview by author, Land Bureau - Maine Department Environmental
Protection,Augusta Maine, February 8, 1990.
1}
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Therefore, state judicial actions represent only approximately 9% of the
enforcement activity.
Although citizen suits were first instituted in 1970, fewer than 25 suits
were fIled between 1970 and 1978)5 It wasn't until 1983 that they became a
significant factor in environmental enforcement.
As can be seen in Table 2, during the period from 1982 through 1986 the

number of citizen actions jumped from 41 to 266. Their presence has
remained significant since the mid 1980's.

Table 2: The Number of Citizen Actions
300
250
200
150
100
50

o +--L-f-II---r
1 979 1 980 1 981 1 982 1 983 1 9,84 1 985 l' 986 1 981

(Source: Otizen suit database compiled by the author from data in Lisa Jorgenson and Jeffrey
Kimmel, "Environmental Citizen Suits: Confronting the Corporation" Bureau of National
Affairs S eciJJl Re 11 (1988), 113-165.)

15David Allan Feller, "Private Enforcement of Federal Antipollution Laws through Citi2en
Suits: A Model" Denver Law]oumal6(J no. 4 (1983t 553.
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A number of environmental groups predominated in the citizen suit
enforcement arena during the period from 1978-1987. Organizations such as
Sierra Club, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, and the Natural Resources
Defense Council took a leadership role in citizen suit enforcement.
Some statutes have spawned many more citizen actions than others.
Table 3 details the number of claims occurring under each statute over the 10
year period from 1978-1987.

The Clean Water Act and the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act triggered the lion's share of the suits. In
many cases, one notice would involve claims under a number of
environmental statutes. Interestingly, the Oean Air Act, the forerunner of
the entire process, was responsible for fewer suits than later acts. Later in this
section explanations for this pattern will be offered.

Table 3: Number of Oaims Filed Under Each Statute
CWA

ReRA

945
322

CERCLA
TSCA
CM

17

SDWA

11

106
13

(Source: Otizen suit database CXJmpiled by the author from data
in Lisa jorgenson andjeffrey KimmeL "Environmental OtizeJl
Suits: Confronting the Corporation" Bureau 01 National AHaJrs

5

alRe

rt(1988),11~165J
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OveMew
As these data make quite clear, citizen suits are becoming a widely used

method of enforcing environmental statutes. The remainder of this paper
will provide a detailed description, analysis and evaluation of citizen suits.
The author has been able to computerize a rather large data base to support
the analysis of this project.
The next section will provide some historic and descriptive
background on such issues as how citizen suit powers are delegated, what
limitations are placed on the citizens, what parties are on each side of a suit,
what citizens can enforce against, and the types of remedies available. This
section will also discuss the differences in citizen suit provisions between the
various environmental statutes.
The following section of the paper will provide an economic analysis
of citizen suits.

It will begin with a discussion of why non-profit

organizations, especially non-profit environmental organizations exist,
detailing the economic factors which instigate their creation and activities.
Three models will be developed to investigate the evolution and effects of
citizen suits. By providing analysis of the demand for citizen suits from the
point of view of a potential litigator, the first model shows how the varying
remedies, limitations, and reimbursement procedures can effect both the
level and types of activities undertaken. The second model shows how firm
behavior could be expected to respond to citizen suits. FinaUy, a third model
will look specifically at the issue of efficiency to determine whether the
introduction of citizen enforcement leads to greater or lesser economic
efficiency in pollution control. This section will also discuss where citizen
suits fit best in the realm of environmental enforcement, including a

8

discussion of where they work particularly well and where other types of
enforcement may be preferable.

II. THE RISE OF CITIZEN SUITS
Citizen suits were initiated to authorize citizen groups" for the first
time" to setve as private attorney generals seeking to protect the public from
harm rather than recoup their own economic losses. Due to ineffective
federal and state environmental programs and enforcement mechanisms in
the 1960 1s" the resulting dissatisfaction lead to a recognition that new
solutions to the increasing environmental problems were required. Thus we
saw the amendment of citizen suits to the environmental statutes dUring the

1970'5.1 6
A petvasive recognition that the government had neither the time nor
resources to provide enough enforcement led Congress to create citizen suits.
However" the political compromises which paved the way for citizen suits
were also responsible for adoption of a number of restrictions on their
powers.

Restrictions on Citi2en Suits
While adopting the citizen suit amendments, Congress was cautious
not to afford the citizens too much power. This caution lead to a number of
limitations and guidelines which have embodied the citizen suit provisions.

16 Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part t

Environmental Law Reporter, 13 (1983).10310.
9

60 Day Notice Reqyirement

"No action may be commenced
(A) prior to 60 days aFter plaintiFF has given notice of the
violation 0) to the Administrato~ aD to the State in which the
violation occurs~ (lii) to any alleged violator of the standard/
limitation or order.1 7
Thus citizens have been prohibited from initiating action before 60
1

days notice was provided to EPA, the statel and the alleged violator. The only
exception involves hazardous waste violations; when a violation involves
hazardous substances which represent an imminent hazardl citizens can take
immediate action. I8 The purpose of this requirement is not only to allow the
government a last chance to perfonn its enforcement duty, but also to notify
the alleged violatorl who may then attempt to avoid suit by coming into
compliance. Voluntary compliance eliminates the need for a costly legal
proceeding.
45 Day Review Petiod
A 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Ac~ one of the more frequently
used statutesl requires citizens to submit a copy of any proposed consent
decreel under which the U.S. is not a partyl to the Attorney General and the
Administrator at EPA. These proposed consent decrees are not fInal until
both the Attomey General and the EPA administrator are given 4S days to
review the settlement. 19 If either disagree to the terms of the settlement they

17 Section 304, 42 U.s.c. 7604.
M David Allan Feller, "Private Enforcement of Federal Antipollution Laws through Citizen
Suits: A Model" Denver Lawjouma160 no. 4 (983), 556.
1933 USC 1319 (gX6)(b).
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can object to the acceptance of the decree. In most cases if an objection does
occur the Attorney General or EPA will specify changes to be made to the
consent decree which will then make it acceptable.

Pilisent Prosecution Bar to Citizen Suits

IINo action may be commenced
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil action in court...but in any such
action in a court any person may intervene as a matter of
right.//20

A second restriction bars citi2en suits when federal judicial action is
already taking place. Though this statement may seem rather clear-cut to the
layman, considerable controversy has surrounded the meaning of the phrase
"action in court" and what constitutes a "court." Baughman v. Bradford Coal

Company21 first addressed the issue of whether administrative proceedings
constitute "action in court" and therefore bar citizen suits. The court found
that administrative action is sufficient to constitute "action in court,"
however noted that administrative action does not necessarily constitute an
"action in court." Therefore it leaves the decision to the court in each case to
decide whether administrative action is sufficient to bar citi2en suits. In
general citizen suits has not been allowed to proceed when an administrative
proceeding have been initiated. M PRSA and ESA specifically specify that
citizen suits are barred if administrative penalty assessment proceedings have
been initiated, and CWA, TSCA and EPCRA, bar citizen suits if
administrative action is taking place.

20 Section 304,42 US.c. 7604.
21 592 Fld 215 <3rd Cir.1979J.
11

Intervention
"...any person may intelVene as a matter of right in any such
action in a court"22

While citizens are often barred from suit if judicial or administrative
action is taking place, the statutes also stipulate that citizens can intelVene in
public enforcement proceedings. The intervention may involve 1) any
person, 2) on any side of the case, 3) in any government civil action filed after
notice of citizen suit to enforce the provision alleged to have been violated.
The citizen intervenes as a co-plaintiff with the govemment and the
infonnation presented on their behalf is expected to be unique and non
repetitive. 23 However, although the statutes state that citizens can intervene
in federal court proceedings, this does not allow them intervention in
administrative proceedings. A resulting asymmetry in the intervention
provision is quite obvious.

Citizens can be barred from judicial and

administrative actions yet can only intervene in judicial actions. On the
other hand, EPA can intervene at any time in a citizen suit.
All statutes except MPRSA and ESA allow citizen intervention in civil
court actions, while only TSCA pennits intervention in administrative
proceedings.

Although most statutes do not allow intervention in

administrative proceedings, the Department of Justice does provide for public
comment on proposed consent decrees. 24

22Sec tion 304,42 U S.c. 7604.
23 Jeffrey G. Miller, "Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws-Part IJ
Environmental Law Reponer14 (1984).10072-73.
24 Bonney Cashin, "Keys to Successful Lawsuits: Recommendations fot Private Citizen
Enforcement" (Unpublished paper), 25.
\I
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Standini Requirement
According to legal tradition, only those groups detennined to have
"standing" can bring an action. The conditions under which a citizen, or
citizen group has standing to sue has come up repeatedly. Most statutes
authorize Il any person" or "any citizen ll to setve as a plaintiff in citizen suits.
The acts state that in order to have standing citizens must have "any interest
which is or may be adversely affected"lS
The most important court decision regarding the issue of standing
occurred in Sierra Club v. Morton. 26 Legislative intent was clearly followed in
this case.

The Supreme Court found that the Sierra Club had not

demonstrated standing in a suit against a recreational development project
near Sequoia National Park because it had not demonstrated that it was
adversely affected or hanned by the proposed project. The court stipulated
that while Sierra Club's particular interest in environmental enforcement
was not a sufficient basis to yield them standing, a claim that one or more
members were injured would.
The Sierra Club had lost the decision but won an important precedent.
Because the Supreme Court decision provides for a liberal interpretation of
the "standing" requirement, subsequent citizen suits have not had much
trouble meeting it. Of the 1205 suits in the citizen suit database, only 4 were
dismissed due to lack of standing. In general, passing a two-pronged test is
required for standing: 1) the act complained of must cause injUry to the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's members if such plaintiff is an organization and 2)
the injury must be within the zone of interest of the pollution control

25Section 505, 33 U S.C.1365.
26 405 US. 727, 2 ELR 20192 (1972).
13

statutes. 27 In some cases economic interest is considered within the "zone of
interest" stipulated in the statutes. For example, a corporate plaintiff who has
complied with a particular set of requirements may be allowed to undertake a
citizen suit against another corporation who has caused them economic
injury by not complying with the regulations.28 Though "economic interest"
suits bring about compliance, they are motivated by rather different objectives
than nonnal citizen suits.29
Remedies
The breadth of authority given to citizens is stated in the cit:i2en suit
sections.

Under RCRA30, SDWA31, M PRSA32, DPA33, OCSLA34, and

SMCRA35 citi2ens are given a broad authority to enforce all violations of the
statutes. However, the Clean Air Act stipulates that citizens can enforce only
violations of "emissions standards or limitations ll,36 and the Oean Water Act
allows enforcement against violations of "effluent standards or
limitations",31 obviously these acts provide more limited authority. While
other statutes allow citizens to sue against any violation of the requirements

27J effrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part r,
Environmental Law Reporter, 13 (1983),10316.
28 Bonney Cashin, "Keys to Successful Lawsuits: Recommendations for Private Citizen
Enforcement" (Unpublished paper), 9.
29 &amples of cases involving economic motives are: Kaiser Cement Corp V. San Diego Air
Pollution Control Board, 12 ELR 20783 (SO Cal 1982). and Consolidated Edison Co. v. Realty
InvestmentsAssociation,524 F. Supp 150,12 ELR 20208 (SO NY 1981).
30 Section 7002, 42 US.c. 6972.
31 Section 1440,42 U S.c. 300j-8.
32 Section 105(G),33 US.c. 1415(g).
33 Section 16,33 US.C.1515.
34 Section 23, 42 U.S.c. 1349(a).
35 Section 520,30 U S.C.1270.
36 Section 304,42 US.c. 7604.
37 Section 505, 33 U.s.C.1365.
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of the act1 CWA and eM. only allow suits against violations of the standards
and not against violations of information requests, reporting.. or entry
requests.
In most environmental statutes, citizens are offered an injunctive
remedy. Types of injunctive relief vary. Some require compliance with
statutory requirements, or creation of compliance schedules, while others
require closure of facility, and/or restoration of the environmental damage
caused.38 For example, the Clean Air Act allows citizens
to enForce such an emission standard or limitation" or such
an order" or to order the Administrator to perfonn such act or
duty as the case may be.. 1139
1/•••

The injunctive power available to citizen plaintiffs is equal to the injunctive
power of the federal govemment.
Under the CW A, RCRA CERCLA and EPCRA. citizens may sue for an
injunction, but in addition are also given the power to "...apply any
appropriate civil penalties." 40 The amount of penalty can vary between
510,000 and 525,000 per day, per violation. Continued violation under
CERCLA and EPCRA can lead to penalties of up to $75,000 per day, per
violation. 41

The civil penalties assessed in citizen suits are calculated to

remove any Nsignificant economic benefits

N

which resulted from

noncompliance with federal environmental statutes. The following factors
are considered when detennining the benefit component: 1) the amount and
types of costs a defendant has delayed paying through noncompliance, ie.,..
38 Bonney Cashin, "Keys to Successful Lawsuits; Recommendations for Private Citizen
Enforcement" (U npublished papert 28.
39 Section 304, 42 US.c. 7604.
40 Section 505, 33 US.C.l365.
41 Bonney Cashin, "Keys to Successful Lawsuits; Recommendations for Private Citizen
En!£lrcement" (Unpublished paper),~.
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the time and costs of installing pollution control equipment, 2) the savings
gained by failing to operate and monitor the proper pollution control
equipment, 3) the competitive advantage gains over competitors who have
installed the required pollution control equipment. Other factors considered
are the size of the violator, the amount and toxicity of the pollution, the
length of time the violation continued, and the sensitivity of the
environment affected. 42
A number of controversies have arisen regarding when citizens can
seek penalties.

While an injunction obviously allows for enforcement

against a continuous violation, court decisions have been contradictory
regarding the issue of whether penalties can be assessed for past, ongoing. or
intennittent violations. The Supreme Court, in Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Fdn.,43 issued the final compromise ruling. The court held

that although penalties cannot be assessed solely for past violations, they can
be assessed for violations which have occurred intennittently in the past and
are likely to continue in the future. In these circumstances, penalties may be
requested as long as they are accompanied with a reasonable request for an
injunction. 44

42 lisa jorgenson and jeffrey Kimmel, "Environmental Omen Suits: Conrrontingthe
Corporation", Bureau ofNational Affairs Special Report (1988), 12-13.
43 791 Fld 304 (4th Circuit), 107 S. Ct. 872 (1987).
44This decision provides a compromise between Ham1<.erv. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.,
756 E'ld 392 (5th Cir. 1985), which denied penalties for solely past violations and Chesapeake
Bay Fdn. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 791 Fld 304 (4th Cir. 1986),which allowed penalties for
solely past violations by allowing penalties for ongoing or intennittent violations.
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Attorney Fee Reimbursement
Under the American Rule 45, each party in a court case must bear its
own litigation expenses. In the past, certain exceptions have circumvented
the American Rule. Under the common benefit exception developed in the
1960's, the courts recognized that plaintiffs acting to protect interests broader
than their own should not bear the full cost of litigation. This exception,
however, did not reimburse fees for actions perfonned in the general public
interest, only those perlonned for an identified group of people. The private
attomey general theory, created dUring the 1970's, was an extension of the
common benefit theory. The private attomey general theory recognizes that
fees should be awarded for actions performed in the general public interest
because othenvise few people would have an incentive to protect the public
good. Congress followed the private attorney general theory when they
included attorney fee reimbursement procedures in the citizen suit
provisions of the environmental statutes. 46
Citizen suit provisions stipulate that citi2ens or citizen groups can seek
reimbursement for court costs including the costs of discovery, attomey fees,
expert witness fees etc. when the action is deemed "appropriate" by the courts.

liThe court in iSSUing any final order in any action may award
costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees) to any party whenever the court detennines such
award is appropriate. 1147

45TheAmerican Rwe is based in the US. adversarial legal system, to learn more about it see:
Scott J. Jordan, "Awarding Attorney Fees to Environmental Plaintiffs under a Private Attorney
General Theory" EnvlronmentaJ Mairs Law Review, vo1.14 (Winter 1987), 29405.

45Section 505,33 USC 1365.
46Jordan, 29405.
47Section 50S) 33 USC 1365.
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Citizen groups are reimbursed for those claims under which they are
successful or partially successfut therefore" providing incentives not to take
harassment suits. No reported decision has refused to make an attorney fee
award to a successful plaintiff in a citizen suit. 48 However" in Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club 49 the Supreme Court ended awards to wholly unsuccessful
plaintiffs" but left open the possibility of awards to partially successful
petitioners. The decision in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch so allowed attorney fee
reimbursement for partial success. Attomey fee awards can also be made to
the defendant when action against them is proved to be harassing or
frivolous. The computation of the attorney fee award takes into account the
following considerations:
1) Time and Labor required

2) Novelty/difficulty of issues
3) Skills required for proper representation
4) Preclusion of other employment
5) Customal)' fees
6) Time limits
7) Amount involved/results obtained
8) Experience and reputation of attorney
9) Undesirability of case
10) Nature of professional relationship with client
11) Awards in similar cases.51
Although now a common element in environmental enforcement"
citizen suits are obviously not uncomplicated. The goal of the remainder of
this paper will be to analyze" in depth" the specific rules and requirements of
citizens suits from an economic perspective in order to detennine whether
48 Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part II t
Environmental Law Reporter, 14 (984), 10411-10413.
49 103 S. Ct 3274,3278-79,13 ELR 20664, 20666 (1963)
SO 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.I982).
51Je£frey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part III,
Environmental Law Reporte; 14 (1984),10416-10417.
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citizen suits create greater efficiency in the enforcement system and to specify
any changes necessary to improve the system.

III. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN SUITS
Departing from descriptive analysis of citizen suits, it is necessary to
probe deeper in order to understand the motivation for citizen suits and the
determinants of the level of litigation and the effects of that litigation. We
begin by creating a model to explain what economic forces create the existence
of non-profit environmental groups in the first place. The implications of
this model are then tested using the citizen suit database.
Within the private market inefficiencies often exist. Extemalities are
created when profit-making £inns do not consider the social effects of their
activities.

Environmental problems represent one well-known type of

inefficiency. A polluting finn may be maximizing its profits, but making
choices which do not maximize social net benefits. Specifically, it will
produce too much pollution. Such a situation involves market failure, a case
in which the price system fails to produce the socially optimal quantity of a

good.
In the past, the government has been expected to be the sole means of
correcting such externalities by enacting rules, standards, penalties or
subsidies. The appropriate application of these instruments changes the
incentives of the producer and forces a recognition of the external costs of
their actions.
However, political solutions are not always efficient solutions; they fail
in some cases to correct such market failures. Self-interest in politics can
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create political failure just as it can create market failure in economics.
l

When an inefficiently low level of environmental quality results from the
political process this creates a demand for environmental organizations.
l

Therefore environmental advocacy activities supplement government
l

activity in order to balance public and private costs and benefits.
Two basic models will address the economic effects of citizen suits,
First, a model of demand for citizen suits on behalf of environmental
organizations is introduced. In this model the economic effects of various
citizen suit provisions will be analyzed. Second a model of finn behavior
l

will be provided to derive the expected economic effects of citizen suits on the
finns. The degree to which citizen suits can help to restore the hannony
between social and private incentives will be assessed.
From these models testable hypotheses will be fanned and conclusions
regarding these issues will be drawn. Evidence used to test the the hypotheses
comes from the database which consists of 1205 citizen suits. FinallYI an
overall efficiency model will be presented in order to detennine the
conditions under which citizen suits represent a move toward a more
efficient enforcement system.
The Database
The data used to support the following analysis has been computerized
by the author and used to discern trends as well as to test a series of
hypotheses derived from three original economic models. The infonnation
which is included in the database is compiled from a Bureau of National
Affairs Special Report.52 The 1205 citizen actions compiled in the database are
52 Usa Jorgenson and Jeffrey KimmeL "Environmental Citizen Suits; Confronting the
Corporation", Bureau ofNational ARabs Special Report (1988), 113-165. The Bureau of
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classified by state and include information regarding plaintiffs, defendants,
date notice and/or complaint was filed, and statutes involved in the claim. A
number of citizen actions involve claims under more than one statute. The
majority of citizen suits over the last decade have occurred under the
following statutes: Clean Water Act (CWA), Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), Comprehensive

Environmental Response

Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA), Clean Air Act (CAA), and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).
Therefore, the analysis will focus primarily on these statutes.
Other information retrieved from the Bureau of National Affairs
report includes settlement activity (whether the case was settled in or out of
court), the amount of penalties involved in the settlement, and where the
penalties will go. Although 1205 citizen suits are compiled in the database,
due to lack of information only 507 settlements are recorded.

These

settlements will be used to support the analysis, however, the reader should
note the limitation placed on the analysis due to the fact that only a portion of
the actual settlements are available.
Unlike most data on citizen actions which only recognizes those
actions which proceed through court, this database is unique because it
provides information on citizen suits at the notice stage. Some of these
notices proceed into court cases and some do not.

National Mairs is a research organization which publishes and sells articles and data. The
Bureau of National Affairs retrieved the data from filings with EPA headquarters and the
data on settlement activity was based on discussions with attorneys, individuals and
environmental groups.
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Model I - The Demand for Citizen Suits
The Deyelovment of Non-profit Environmental Groups
In order to detennine the role citizen suits play in environmental
enforcementl it is important to first understand why citizen suits take place
and how economic incentives promote or prevent this type of enforcement.
Why do non-profit groups develop?

The theory pursued in this

researchl a variant of a model originally developed by Weisbrod 53, suggests
that nonprofit groups arise to provide public goods which are incompletely
supplied by the govemment. If the govemment does not supply the efficient
amount of public goods, an unsatisfied demand for higher levels of provision
exists. Non-profits arise to satisfy some of this unsatisfied demand.
One such public good is environmental quality.

When the

govemment is unable to produce the efficient amount of environmental
qualityl non-profit environmental groups work to bring about higher levels.
This would be expected whenever the increased benefits of environmental
quality to the membership would exceed the cost of securing that
improvement. Environmental groups have become organized to increase
the amount of environmental protection and maintain themselves through
membership feesl contributions l grantsl etc.
The Simple Model
One process by which non-profit environmental groups pursue higher
environmental quality is by initiating private enforcement actions or citizen
suits. Environmental groups undertaking citizen suits must first determine
.53 Burton A Weisbrod, The Non-profit Economy, (H an>a.rd Univ. Press: Cambridge,
Massachusetts 1988).
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the amount of resources available; and which suits to pursue. To understand
the circumstances which influence such decisions; and to fonnulate
hypotheses to be tested, a simple model of a typical environmental group1s
decision making process is posed. In this model the group is presumed to
maximize the net benefits (the excess of benefits over costs) from its litigation
activity.
To operationalize this model it is necessary to specify exactly what the
benefits and costs of litigation are. The increase in environmental quality
which results from successful enforcement is the prime benefit to the
organization. Members, foundations and other donors like to see successful
action taking place.

Not only will the possibility of improving

environmental quality yield a support base for the environmental groups, but
it will attract new members and donors as well. When a successful suit has
precedent value (meaning that it facilitates subsequent enforcement actions),
the benefits are even larger.
Environmental groups are presumed to focus their energy initially on
the cases which offer the highest increase in expected environmental
improvement. Expected environmental improvement is the product of two
variables: the probability the suit will result in an improvement and the
value of the resulting improvement. The value of the improvement would
depend on such factors as the toxicity of the substance, amount of the
substance involved and the amount of exposure to the substance by humans
or other species in the ecological system. Since the marginal benefit is the
value of the environmental improvement gained by taking on the suit with
the next highest benefits, as the organization moves further down its list of
litigation targets the marginal benefit decreases. Cases with a lower benefit to
the citizen organization will be considered after those offering higher benefits.
23

The cost of litigation includes the time and money spent by the
environmental organization on enforcement processes.

Discovery,

investigation, lawyer fees, court costs, and support staff are all expenses that
have to be covered. The Me (marginal cosO, the additional cost of taking on
another suit, is assumed to increase with further litigation activity because
lower cost cases (easier to prosecute, high probability of winning) are chosen
first; later cases are more difficult and more costly.
An injunctive remedy is available to citizens under all statutes. The

litigation activity choice for a typical environmental group seeking this
remedy is depicted on Figure 1-1.54

MC1

$Iunit

MB1

A*
Figure '&1

Amount Enforcement Action
(AEA)

54 The effect of alternative remedies will be discussed in a later section.
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To maximize net benefits environmental groups will take on
additional suits until MC1=MBl (Marginal Cost=Marginal Benefit), For Figure
I-1 this occurs at A·. Further action past this level would lead the costs of
enforcement action to exceed the benefits. A· is the amount of enforcement
which the environmental group is expected to take.
One interesting implication of this model can be derived immediately.
If govemment enforcement were complete, all polluters would be in
compliance with their legal requirements. Since a successful citizen suit
action depends upon proving a violation of these reqUirements, the
probability of successful litigation activity would be zero. With a zero
probability of winning the expected environmental improvement for all cases
would be zero; the marginal benefit curve would collapse to a point which
coincides with the origin. Therefore, citizen suits would not develop if
government enforcement were complete because no marginal benefit would
be derived from taking enforcementaction.
Another implication, this one testable, follows immediately. Since the
marginal benefit curve shifts leftward as govemment enforcement activity
increases, it follows that the optimal level of private enforcement will be
inversely related to the amount of public enforcement.
Hypothesis 1 - All other things being equal, more
citizen enforcement will take place when less
govemment enforcement is taking place.
The evidence seems to support this hypothesis. Many national
environmental organi2ations correctly perceived a slowdown in federal
environmental enforcement, especially under the Clean Water Act, in 1981
and 1982. The actual slowdown is demonstrated in Table 4.
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Table 4
Federal Enforcement
Referral of cases to the Department ofJustice and case filings
(Nwnber of notices/Number of suits filed)
~

All Statytes

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

262/131
242/1&4
204/163
116/118
110/47
162/199
167/92

Gean WaterAct

137/69
1/81
55/49
36/32
46/14
56/77
63/41

(Source:jeffrey Miller 1JPrivate Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws~ Part 111"
Environmental Law Re ner 14 (1984),10424.)

Declines in the EPA budget mirror the declines in environmental
programs and enforcement dUring the early 1980's. In 1981, EPA's total
budget was 1.4 billion. This decreased to 1.16 billion in 1982 and further
reductions of approximately 975 million occurred in 1983. These budget
decreases caused a resulting fall in the number of EPA staff enforcement
attorneys from 200 to 30 dUring 1983.55 As the hypothesis would lead us to
expect, the citizen suit database shows that citi2en suits increased from 41 in
1982 to 165 in 1983 and then to 204 in 1984. This increased occurred
specifically under CWA claims which increased from 32 in 1982 to 172 in 1983

55 David Allan Feller, "Private Enforcement of Federal Antipollution Laws through Citi2en
Suits: A Model" Denver Law]oumaJ60 no. 4 (1983), 554.
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and then to 240 in 1984. Therefore, while federal enforcement was decreasing
in the early 1980's private enforcement was increasing.
The Penalty Award Provision
While most statutes provide for an injunctive remedy, the case
examined in Figure 1-1, CWA, RCRA, CERCLA, and EPCRA have provided
for penalties to be awarded in addition to an injunction.
While the criteria for deciding when additional penalties may be
possible is not clearly specified by recent court decisions, the impact of the
various decisions on private litigation can be explored with the litigation
mode1. 56 While these decisions can have significant effects on polluter
incentives, a topic discussed in the model of firm behavior in a later section"
they also affect the environmental groups litigation decision.
The ability to receive penalties, as well as an injunction, increases the
benefits from private litigation activity. As described by Stephanie Pollack at
the Conservation Law Foundation:
li\n injunction just makes them do. what they should have for

the last 10years" penalties dean up the problems resulting from
their noncompliance,IIS7
Because, an action seeking injunction and penalties is perceived by the
organizations and members to have a higher deterrence value and ultilnately
a higher probability of environmental improvement, the marginal benefit
56 In Hamkerv. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co. the 5th Circuit allowed ~alties to be
assessed only for ongoing violations. However, in Chesapeake Bay Fein. v. Gwaltney of
Sm ith1ieJd the 4th Circuit Nled that penalties can be assessed even if based solely on past
violations. The Supreme Court made a final ruling in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake
Bay Fdn. Inc. when it decided that a penalty assessment will be pennitted only when the
request for penalties is accompanied with a reasonable request of injunctive relief.
S7 Stephanie Pollack,. interview by author, ConsetVation Law Foundation, Boston
Massachusetts, Februaly 1, 1990.
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curve increases from MBl to MB2. Since the finn sued for an injunction and
penalties faces a higher cost of noncompliance it is presumed more likely to
l

comply with regulations.

The reasonableness of this presumption is

demonstrated subsequently in the model of firm behavior.

Figure 1-2

demonstrates the effect of the availability of financial penalties on the
environmental groups litigation decision. A is the amount of litigation
activity with only an injunctive remedy while B is the amount when
penalties are assessed as well.

$Iunit

MB2
MB1

A

B

Figure 1-2

Amount Enforcement Action

(AEA)

The implication is clear; statutes which allow penalty actions can be
expected to induce a higher level of citizen suit litigation activity than those
which allow only injunctions. Only the four statutes mentioned above allow
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a penalty remedy. This difference among statutes immediately suggests
another testable hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 - All other things being equal" a
greater number of actions will take place under
CWA, RCRA, CERCLA and EPCRA than other
statutes because they allow a penalty remedy.
Once again, the evidence seems to support the hypothesis.

The

database focuses on six statutes, CWA, RCRA, CERCLA, TSCA. eM,. and
SDWA. Of the 1205 citizen actions in the database, CWA was involved in 945
claims, RCRA in 322, CERCLA in 106, TSCA in 17, CAA in 13, and SOWA in
11. The fact that the 3 statutes with by far the highest number of claims are
statutes which allow penalties seems to strongly support Hypothesis 2.
A fonnal hypothesis test can be conducted to see if the difference in the
average number of suits taken under penalty statutes and the average
number of suits taken under non-penalty statutes is statistically significant.
The fannula used is as follows:

where:

Xl == 457.67 (The average number of suits taken under penalty statutes)
X2 == 13.67 (The average number of suits taken under non-penalty statutes)
n1 == 3 (The number of penalty statutes)
n2 = 3 (The number of non-penalty statutes)

s2 =an estimate of the variance in each population.
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n
s2.
1

=~ ('<i - X)2

L..J

n-1

i=1

s2j = sample variance.
t

= 67.65, this difference in means is significant at the 99% confidence level.

penalties Eannarked to an Environmental Fund
The litigation model implies that the amount and type of litigation
activity is affected not only by whether a penalty remedy is available, but also
the disposition of the penalty. Penalties usually go to the general treasury and
the marginal benefit received on behalf of the environmental group is
increased deterrence. However, in some cases the penalties go to a fund
which protects or cleans up the area at stake. These eannarked penalties
assure a larger improvement in environmental quality in the specific area
covered by the suit than achieved by general revenue penalties. If the citizen
group did not care about this area, they preswnably would not have brought
suit. Therefore, this further increase in environmental quality would provide
yet another increase in benefits to the environmental groups for those suits
where earmarked penalties are possible. This implies that the benefits from
litigation will be higher for those cases offering the possibility of earmarked
penalties than for those where eannarked penalties are not possible.
The availability of eannarked penalties also changes the litigation
priorities for the citizen group. Suits offering the possibility of earmarked
penalties have higher net benefits and hence will appear earlier in the
priority list of firms engaging in private enforcement.
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Once the finn

reordered its litigation priorities to reflect this difference, one would expect a
rise in the percent of suits with targeted penalties.

Hypothesis 3 - Targeted penalties suits will
comprise a larger portion of litigation activity as
more earmarking cases are successful because
citizen groups will recognize their ability allocate
money to their specific area of interest through
penalty earmarking.
Although the database does not provide extensive data regarding the
settlement of all the 1205 cases, it does show that eannarking occurred as early
as 1982 but didn't become widespread until the mid to late 1980's. Over the
period from 1978 to 1987,80% of the cases involving penalties dedicated the
money to an environmental fund rather than the U.S. Treasury.

The

num ber of suits involving penalty earmarking is significantly higher than
the number of suits which dedicate funds to the U.S. Treasury. This can be
seen in Table 5.

TableS
Dedication of Penalties
Year
1983
1984
1985
1986

Eannarked

Non-Eannarked

2

o

12

2

16

5
10

42

(Source: Citizen suit database)
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The average amount of penalties assessed under e.annarking is also larger
than the average amount assessed under non-eannarking. An average
eannarked penalty equals approximately $223,527, while an average non
eannarked penalty equals $72,543.58 A reason for this may be the theory that
penalties eannarked to an environmental fund are perceived by a polluter a
public imaging tool. Also, in some cases, targeted penalties are tax deductible
which will not only lead fums to offer such settlements, but may lead to
larger penalty assessments.

Attorney Fee Reimbursement
Attomey fee reimbursement is yet another factor which can be expected
to influence the level and type of litigation activity. Some federal statutes
allow citizen groups to be reimbursed for all the court costs including lawyer
fees. If the citizen action is deemed to be lIappropriatell, the environmental
group will be reimbursed their attorney fees.

However, they are only

reimbursed for the claims in which they are successful or at least partially
successful. This prevents any incentives to take nuisance or harassment
suits. Of the 507 settlements recorded in the database only 4 involved a
decision for the defendant. Obviously citi2ens are careful in making sure
their suits are warranted. Since a typical suit involves several claims, partial
reimbursement is a possible outcome. With attomey fee reimbursement, the
net costs (after reimbursement) placed on environmental groups decrease. As
seen in Figure 1-3, MCl decreases to MC2 and litigation activity increases
substantially. In the absence of reimbursement procedures citizen suit
58citizen Suit Database
32

enforcement would not be as effective due to the fact that citizen groups
would take far fewer enforcement actions if they have to balance the very
high costs of litigation against the benefit, environmental quality, which is a
public good.
Because attomey fees are not usually provided for in state statutes or
judicial review sections, the following hypothesis can be tested.59

Hypothesis 4 - All other things being equal, more
citizen suits could be expected under federal statutes
than under state statutes since attomey fees are not
usually reimbursed under state statutes.
Once again the data seem to support the hypothesis. Of all 1205 citizen
suits in the period from 1978 to 1987 only 55 were brought under state
statutes. The importance of attomey fee reimbursement cannot be overstated.
The availability of attomey fees enables citizens to balance the costs and
benefits of enforcement action and gives them a greater incentive to protect
the public good.
The difference in the proportion of citizen suits taken under state
statutes and the proportion of citizen suits taken under federal statutes can
also be tested using a formal hypothesis test.
The formula used is as follows:

where:

59 Another hypothesis, this one untestable, is that more suits have taken place since the
attomey fees have become commonly reimbursed. A time-series test on whether citizen suits
increased due to the availability of reimbursement cannot be perfonned because all citizen suits
allow reimbursement.
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PI = 0.954 (The proportion of suits taken under federal statutes)
P2 = 0.0456 (The proportion of suits taken under state statutes)
"1 = 1150 (The number of claims under federal statutes)
n2 = 55 (The nwnber of claims understate statutes)

2 = 2328~

this difference in proportions is significant at the 99% confidence

level.

MC1

$'unit

MC2

MB1

A B
Figure 1-3

Amount Enforcement Action
(AEA)

Umjtations to Citizen Suits
Not all aspects of current citizen suit provisions serve to encourage
private litigation activity. Some limitations are also placed on all citizen suit
provisions.

Two such limitations involve the 60 day notice and 45 day

review provisions. Both allow the federal govemment to maintain a large
amount of control over the initiation and completion of a citizen suit and to
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preempt private action when it chooses to do so. The federal govemment has
60 days to take over the suit once it is initiated. If the private suit is allowed
to proceed, the government has 45 days to review the final decision and make
comments.

These provisions have varying effects on private litigation

activity.
Two situations can result from these provisions.

First, if the

govemment takes over a suit and perfonns effective enforcement actions,
this case is a boon for the environmental group; it can reap the same benefits
without using as many resources. In tenns of the litigation model the M B
curve would stay the same and Me would decrease from Mel to Me2 due to
the fact that the citizens will reap the same benefit without taking suit
themselves. As a result the model would suggest an increase in litigative
activity as shown in Figure 1-4.

MC2

MC1

$Iunit

A B
Figure 1-4
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Amount Enforcement Action
(AEA)

However, a second situation could also result. If the govemment take
over was due to political pressure, a more lax settlement might result than
that of the environmental group.

This would obviously decrease the

deterrence benefit perceived by the environmental group. The government
frequently objects to a citizen suit during the 45 day review period if penalties
are eannarked to an environmental fund. 6o The Department of Justice or
EPA will object to a proposed settlement which directs money to an
environmental fund because of their belief that such payments do not follow
the guidelines of the appropriations process and provide the violator with too
much flexibility in carrying out projects. 61 Although the suit may still be
resolved, the penalty assessment may be adjusted, this again would indicate a
decrease in benefits for the environmental group.
The above scenarios would cause a decrease in the marginal benefit
curve as demonstrated in Figure 1-5, resulting in lower litigation activity. In
some cases citizens prefer not to be preempted because they have spent a lot of
time and money investigating a suit and have no avenue through which to
receive reimbursement for these costs if the suit is taken over. Therefore, in
some cases they would prefer to proceed with the citizen action in order to
allow for reimbursement possibilities. If citizen suits are preempted by
judicial action, they can intervene in the case and receive reimbursement for
intervention if the infonnation provided is unique and non-repetitive.
However, if they are barred by administrative action, they are not afforded the
right of intervention and therefore cannot receive reimbursement. Putting
Figure 1-4 together with Figure 1-5 suggests that the effect of these rules is
60 David Drelick,. interview by author, Water Enforcement-Environmental Protection Agency,
Washington D .c., October 13, 1989.
61 Bonney Cashin, "Keys to Successful Lawsuits: Recommendations for Private Citizen
Enforcement" (Unpublished paper), 31.
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ambiguous; they could in principle either increase or decrease litigation
activity.

MC1
$Iunit

MB2

B

A

Figure 1-5

Amount Enforcement Action
(AEA)

Settlement out of Court: Consent Asreements
The previous discussion has assumed that litigation activity results in
a full examination of the issues in a courtroom with a court-imposed
decision. But that is not the only possible outcome. Environmental groups
have the choice of settling out of court fonnally by signing a consent
agreement, or infonnally through a negotiated settlement. Under what
conditions will they do so?
My maintained hypothesis holds that court decisions are viewed by
environmental groups as yielding greater deterrence. While out-of court
settlements involve two-sided negotiations, court decisions are one-sided.
Court decisions can also be used to establish favorable precedents. While
37

consent decrees and negotiated settlements may provide a model to be
followed in other negotiations, they do not have as strong an influence on
future decisions as the precedent emanating from a court decision. The
variance in penalties assessed in and out of court is significantly different and
should be recognized.
As can be seen in Table 6, a higher number of suits involving penalty

assessments occurred in out-of-court settlements. However, although only 20
in-court settlements involved penalty assessments, 3 cases awarded penalties
for 15 million, 8 million and 5 million dollars.

The average penalty

assessment for out-of-court settlements is $89,214, while the average penalty
for in court settlements is $1,928,745; the difference is quite significant.
Although out-of- court settlements involved more penalty assessments, the
average value of these were significantly lower than penalties awarded
through litigation.

Table 6: Penalty Awards
In Court

I
I

Year

# Penalty Awards

Out-of-Court
STotal

1980

1

15,000,000

111981

0

1982

0

1983

0

o
o
o

11984
1985

4
2

800,400

145,000

8,410,000
1986
6
7
14,219,500
1987
(Source: Otizen Suit Database)

1
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# penalty Awards

$Total

o
o

o
o

2

50,000

2

90,000
518,000

13
22

52
32

1,206,450
5,220,000
2,996,690

According to the maintained hypothesis with out-of-court settlements
the MBl CUlVe will decrease to MB2 due to the fact that a weaker method of
enforcement has taken place. However, the costs of reaching an out-oE-court
settlement are much lower than proceeding through a trial. Less time is
involved in settling out of court and citizens avoid the high court costs
associated with trials, therefore MCI decreases to MC2. Figure 1-6
demonstrates the effect of administrative action versus court action without
considering the issue of attomey fee reimbursement.

Mel

$Iunit

-

MBl
MB2

Amount Enforcement Action
(AEA)

Although the model does not yield a detenninant sign for the effect of
settling out of court on the overall amount of litigation activity, it does
suggest some implications for the timing of consent decrees. In some cases
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citizens organizations are willing to accept the lower benefit for the lower cost
and in other cases they are not.

Hypothesis 6 - All other things being equal the
percent of suits settled with consent decrees or
infonnal negotiated settlements will rise over time
because early court cases set precedent which can be
used in later cases. Once the precedent is
established the value of going to court will decrease.
The data does support this hypothesis. As can be seen in the following
table the percentage of suits settled out of court and the percentage of suits
l

settled in court fluctuated by year in the early period. However as the
l

hypothesis states in the later period the percentage of suits settled out of court
l

is greater than the percentage settled in court.

Table 7

Settlements
Year

% Out of Court

1978

67
33

1979
1980
1981

1985

29
80
40
60
62
63

1986

66

1982
1983

1984

%In Court

33
67
71

20
60
40

38
37

34

(Source: Citizen suit database.)

Another hypothesis regarding out of court settlement is as follows:
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Hypothesis 7 - Groups will not settle out of court as
often when a favorable precedent is at stake.
However, this hypothesis is not testable due to the lack of information
regarding the issue of whether an important precedent is at stake in particular
cases. Due to the marginal benefit theory discussed above, the author
theori2es that this will be the case.
Since attomey fees can be awarded for consent decree settlement as well
as court settlement, no monetary incentive to go to court is created. The fact
that state suits do not often allow attorney fee reimbursement leads us to
another hypothesis.

Hypothesis 8 - Cases under state statutes may be
settled out of court more often than federal statutes
because attorney fee reimbursement is not usually
allowed and out of court settlements are cheaper
than trials.
Of the 55 state cases, only 18 settlements are recorded. Although this
obviously limits our analysis, the settlement data which is available follows
the pattern suggested in Hypothesis 8. Of the 18 settlements, 11 were settled
out of court, 7 through infonnal settlements and 4 through consent
agreements. On the other had only 4 were settled in court. The remaining 3
settlements consist of 1 bankruptcy case and 2 government take overs.

Burden of Proof
Under the Clean Water Act, the fums are required under the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) to file discharge
monitoring reports (DMRs) at EPA which list discharge levels, and method of
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discharge. 62 The efficient use of citizen suits depends heavily on the
availability of DMRs.

Citizens have access to the discharge monitoring

reports, and the courts have generally accepted the information contained in
them as proof of violations.63 By allowing citizens to discover and prove the
violations of the statutes so easily, monitoring reports significantly reduce the
cost of taking suit. As can be seen in Figure 1-7, the MCl curve drops to MC2
increasing the amount of enforcement action which takes place.

MC2

MC1

$/unit

A B
Figure 1-7

Amount Enforcement Action

(AEA)

Although the monitoring reports are most consistent under the
NPDES program of the Oean Water Act, reports are available under other
statutes as well. The most commonly cited statutes besides CWA are ReRA
620avid Allan Feller, "Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws Through Citizen
Strlts: A Model", Denver LawJournal, 60 no. 4 (1983): 566.
63 See Student Public Interest Research Group v. Fritzsch, Dodge & Olcott Inc. 579 F. Supp at

1538.
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and CERCLA. These statutes require monitoring, however citizens access is
limited. First of all the statement of violations is more complex and the
reports on their face do not stipulate whether the finn is or isn't in
compliance. Therefore the citizen must be more familiar with the exact
gUidelines of the statute in order to detennine whether compliance is
occurring. Secondly, while CWA reports are available to the public without
condition, reports under other statutes may be deemed confidential and
citizen access forbidden. 64 The availability of these reports still selVes as a
useful tool for the citizen in determining who is violating the statutes,
however they do not reduce the cost of taking action as greatly as the
straightforward discharge monitoring reports under the Clean Water Act.
This may be another reason why we have seen a greater number of suits
taken under the Oean Water Act than other statutes.

Model II - The Model of Finn Behavior
The Simple Model: Enforcement withoyt Citizen Suits
The effectiveness of private enforcement depends not only on how
citi2en groups respond to various incentives but on how the targets of the
suits, the polluters, respond to citizen suits. The previous model represented
the demand for litigation by citizen organizations. This model will consider
polluter incentives resulting from citizen enforcement actions.
The different types of enforcement available affect the amount of
precaution taken by the firm.

We will initially assume the finn faces

64 Adeeb Fadil, NCitizen Suits Against Polluters; Picking up the Pace" Harvard Environmental
Law Review, 9 no. 1 (1985): 68-69.
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administrative or civil government enforcement; this becomes the
benchmark case. We will then add the effect of citizen suits to derive the
resulting effect on the level of precaution.
The initial situation without citizen suits can be seen in Figure II-t the
finn is assumed to be interested in minimizing its costs. Two types of costs
are relevant: (1) the cost of taking the precaution and (2) the costs associated
with noncompliance with the standard. The fanner involves the capital,
material and labor costs associated with greater control of emissions while the
latter involves the expected costs imposed by the court. Expected costs are the
probability of a successful enforcement action multiplied by the expected
penalty.
The marginal expected penalty CUlVe (MEP) is downward sloping
because as precaution increases the expected penalty decreases. The two
sources of this decline are the lower probability that any penalty would be
imposed and the smaller size of any imposed penalty. The M EP curve crosses
the axis at a level of precaution sufficient to guarantee that the appropriate
emission standard be met; this is the level of complete compliance. The
marginal cost of precaution (Mep) CUlVe is upward sloping because the more
precaution, the higher the marginal cost.
The initial equilibrium represents the firm's decision-making process.
They will balance the expected penalty (which will result if they are found to
be in noncompliance and enforcement action takes place), against the cost of
precaution in detennining how much precaution, ie.,. pollution control, to
take. Equilibrium A" in Figure II-I will result; note that A'- in this figure is
less than complete compliance due to the fact that enforcement is not
complete and fmns don't expect to be penalized for all violations. This is not
an uncommon outcome.
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The Initiation of Citizen Suits
With the initiation of citizen suits, the expected penalty to the finn
would increase from M EPI to M EP2 due to the fact that they now face the
injunctive power of citizen suits as well as the federal and state enforcement
powers. Adding the likelihood of a private enforcement action to that of
public enforcement implies a higher probability that a successful enforcement
action against the fum would be forthcoming.
As demonstrated by Figure 11-2, all Finns not in compliance with the

standards under public enforcement can be expected to take higher levels of
precaution when confronted with citizen suits. Finns in compliance will not
change their behavior in response to the threat of citizen suits. Although this
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is in principle a testable hypothesis, in practice no systematic compliance data
are available. However, intetview with officials at EPA and the Conservation
Law Foundation reveal a widespread belief that citizen suits do lead to greater
compliance .65
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Figure 11-2

Effects of Remedy on the Finn
The level of precaution can be expected to be affected by the available
remedies as well as the existence of private enforcement activity. Because
CW A, RCRA, CERCLA and EPCRA allow citizens to sue for an injunction
65stephanie Pollack,. interview by author, Conservation Law Poundation, Boston
Massachusetts, February 1, 1990; Mark Stein,. interview by author, Water Enforcement
Environmental Protecti.onAgeney- Region t Boston, Massachusetts, Deeember6, 1989.
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and penalties, the M EP2 CUlVe for £inns violating those acts increases even
further to MEP3 initiating higher levels of

preca~tion

for noncomplying

finns. (It would have no effect on precaution for complying finns.) Finns
facing suit under these statutes are more likely to be in compliance than finns
facing suit under the other statutes because of the greater likelihood of private
enforcement. (The fact that greater private enforcement could be expected was
demonstrated in Modell), The result is demonstrated in Figure 11-3.
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Figure 11-3

Citizen groups cannot impose criminal penalties, therefore, this effect
would not be expected to have the same deterrent effect on gross negligence,
etc., the types of behavior that trigger criminal indictments by the
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govemment. One immediate implication is that private enforcement is an
incomplete substitute for public enforcement a long as the menu of remedies
differs between the two types of enforcement action. This is particularly
important since civil penalties are insurable and criminal penalties are not.
Since civil penalties are insurable polluters can pay a fee to insure
themselves in case they are penalized for being in violation of pollution
control standards. Therefore they face a lower cost of being caught because
l

insurance allows the polluter to spread the costs among other policy holders.
In effect some finns will be paying for a portion of another finns pollution
control violations. Criminal penaities on the other hand are not insurable.
l

l

Criminal violations involve much higher penalties as well as jail sentences
for corporate officers or employers.

The availability of non-insurable

criminal remedies significantly increases the risk to polluters and therefore
leads them to take more precaution. Citizens, not having this remedy are
obviously more limited than public enforcement.
Whether citizens can sue against past or ongoing violations, can be
expected to affect the amount of precaution taken by noncomplying finns as
well. Under the ruling in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.
penalties can be assessed only if the violation is ongoing. Since the 60 day
notice requirement insures that the firm being sued is notified within 60 days
of suit:,. they may be able to preve.nt penalty assessment completely. If they are
able to stop the violation within 60 days the expected penalty curve will shift
down to the initial curve because they do not expect to be sued by citizens and
therefore only face govemment enforcement. Therefore, one distinct class of
violators namely those who can bring their operations into compliance
l

within 60 daYSI are not likely to be much affected by the existence of private
enforcement.
48

However under Chesapeake Bay Fdn. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield
l

penalties can be assessed even if based on solely past violations. Faced with
this threat the fll1ll must constantly take precautions because they can be sued
at any time for actions which are occuning or have occurred in the past. This
ruling would sustain higher precaution levels for violators who could come
into compliance rather quickly. The MEP curve will shift up from MEP! to
MEP2 as shown in Figure 11-4.
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Figure 11-4

The decision of the 4th Circuit was reversed by the Supreme Court in
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Fdn.. The ruling stated that the

request for penalties must be accompanied by a reasonable request for
injunctive relief. This ruling basically allows penalties if the violation is
ongoing or at least intermittent and likely to occur again in the future. Due to
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this ruling, the M EP curve shifts down to M EP3 which is lower than the
expected penalties under the initial Chesapeake ruling, but higher than the

Ham ker ruling which required the action to be ongoing.

Therefore,

precaution is less than it would have been if penalties were assessed against
past violations but higher than if penalties are required to involve only
ongoing violations as demonstrated in Figure 11-5.
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Figure 11-5

Attorney Fee Reimbyrsement
The availability of attorney fee reimbursement to those undertaking
private enforcement also effects the level of precaution taken by the finn. A
fInn which loses or is not completely successful must reimburse attorney fees,
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court costs, etc. to the plaintiff. This raises the expected penalty. It was also
demonstrated in the fIrst model that the likelihood of being subject to private
enforcement is higher when attorney fees are reimbursed since citizen groups
can be expected to undertake more litigation actively. Both of these cause the
MEP curve to shift out. This can be very costly and therefore increases the
expected penalty curve from MEP2 to MEP3 as shown in Figure II-6.
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In some cases the government has more enforcement power and
remedies available to them than citizens. It is important to recognize the
different situations in order to determine when each type of enforcement is
most effective. After the initiation of citizen suits dUring the 1970's, the
federal government initiated a criminal enforcement program. The effect of
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criminal enforcement is seen in Figure 11-7 below.

The availability of

criminal enforcement increases the MEP cUlVe from MEP3 to MEP4 because
criminal indictments faced by the corporate officers and/or employers carry a
greater expected penalty than civil indictments against the corporation alone.
Therefore even higher levels of precaution take place. In cases where
criminal negligence is involved it may be more effective to allow
government preemption in order to achieve the most effective remedy.
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Figure 11-7

Putting Modell and Model II together, it is possible to forecast a long
run trend for private enforcement. Since complete compliance precludes
successful litigation and the rise of citizen suits causes greater deterrence, and
hence compliance, ultimately a decrease in the number of citi2en suits should
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be expected. Successful citizen suits ultimately undennine the reason for
their existence.
In Models I and II, the economic incentives of the environmental
groups and the polluting finns were addressed. Obviously since the initiation
of citizen suits we have seen greater enforcement.

However, greater

enforcement does not always mean greater efficiency. A number of issues
must be addressed in order to detennine whether citizen suits promote
greater efficiency in general, or if they only lead to efficiency under certain
circumstances.

Model III - The Efficiency Model
The Sjmple Model
Do citizen suits promote greater efficiency? In other words, do they
lead to a balance between social costs and social benefits. Do they only lead to
efficiency under particular circumstances? Can we create a more efficient
overall enforcement mechanism?
As we discussed earlier, whenever extemalities are present, even

perfect competition does not lead to economic efficiency. Extemalities exist
when a producer or consumer does not bear the full marginal cost or enjoy
the full marginal benefit of an economic action. 66 Pollution is a prime
example of an extemality which creates inefficiency in the system due to the
fact the social marginal costs (MCs ) are greater than social marginal benefits if
the finn is not forced to take precautions against pollution.

Without

66 Roy J. Ruffin and Paul R. Gregory, Principles of Mic:ro«cnomics, (Scott. Foresman and
Company: Glenview Illinois 1986); 442-443.
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environmental enforcement the finn will not take into account the social
costs of pollution and therefore will not produce an efficient amount of
pollution control.

The finn will pollute somewhere below the socially

efficient level at a point like B in Figure 111-1.
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Figure 111-1

In Figure 111-1, the amount of pollution control is too low compared to
the efficient leveL Therefore, the government, as the corrector of market
failures, steps in to protect the environment. However, the government
doesn't, at the federal or state level, have the time or resources to enforce all
of the environmental standards perfectly. This is why citizen suits were
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created, to goad the govemment into action, or to pick up where government
leaves off. This section will seek to detennine whether as a whole citizen
suits are efficient, or whether changes can be made to make the statutes more
efficient.
Assuming that government enforcement alone does not bring about
an efficient level of enforcement, the next question involves whether the
addition of citizen suits to the enforcement arena creates a movement
towards efficiency or not. Looking at the picture from a simple perspective it
would seem that the citizen suit, not being faced with political or industrial
pressure, is in the prime spot to pick up where the government leaves off.
Due to the high number of citizen suit successes over the last five years in
particular, it would seem that citizen suits must increase precaution to some
extent. If regulated industry perceives a higher level of enforcement, they are
likely to take more precaution by providing more clean-up in order to avoid
the risk of going to court. This would indicate that finns would take a level
of pollution control closer to the socially efficient level at a point like C in
Figure Figure 111-2 due to the fact that finns are internalizing some of the risk.
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The Standards
In order for citizen suits to create a movement towards efficiency, the
emission or effluent standards themselves must help promote an efficient
solution. The majority of citizen suit cases studied in this paper involved
claims under the Clean Water Act. The effluent standards in the Oean Water
Act are based on specific pollution control technologies known to the
industries. While the industry can choose any technology which controls
emissions to the required degree, they tend to choose the exact equipment
specified in the Act. Therefore, they minimize their risk of wrong doing
because they are following the Act explicitly. The resulting situation is one in
which too much focus is placed on the type of equipment used and not
enough on the amount of emissions reduction. Often times new pollution
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control innovations are not implemented because fIrms view a perceived risk
of straying from the technologies specified in the Clean Water Act. A number
of empirical studies have found that the Clean Water Act provisions are not
cost-effective. 67
Due to the fact that the EPA clean water standards do not provide for
efficient pollution control, it is not possible to guarantee that the addition of
citizen suits to the enforcement arena will lead to efficiency. Although the
finns will perceive a higher threat of enforcement and are likely to take more
precautions,. they will not necessarily do so cost-effectively, but the result will
not necessarily be efficient. The high number of citizen suits under the Clean
Water Act may in some circumstances create inefficiency by forcing firms
facing an excessively high cost of pollution control to clean-up more than
efficiency would dictate; the additional benefits from the further reduction
would be smaller than the costs.
While some effluent standards like those under the Clean Water Act
are excessively stringent, others are excessively lax. Excessive enforcement
occurs whenever the firm is induced into taking more precaution then
efficient. This can happen if an effluent standard is too high. In this case, the
level of precaution exceeds the efficient level and greater compliance implies
a movement away from efficiency as shown in Figure 111-3, point D.

671. H. Tietenberg. Environmental and Natural Resource Economks, (Scott Foresman and
Company: Glenview Illinois 1988):410-415.
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The implication of the analysis suggests that in order for citizen suits
to improve efficiency the effluent standards must be either efficient or less
stringent than efficient. When the effluent standards are inefficiently harsh
can citizen suits fail to promote efficiency.
Citizen suits are targeted precisely at the environmental law where this
problem is most acute, the Oean Water Act. In air pollution, on the other
hand, emissions trading provide a vehicle for those facing excessively
stringent standards to meet them cost-effectively. Adopting a form of
emissions trading like the program under the Oean Air Act would reduce the
particular bias substantially by eliminating the really harsh standards.
Emissions trading assures that the post-trade standards are cost-effective,
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thereby reducing the possibility that citizen suits will promote inefficient
pollution control.
The emissions trading program under the Oean Air Act provides a
cost-effective solution to air pollution control.

By allowing regulated

industries greater flexibility in meeting the requirements of the statute those
facing the harshest standards can reduce their cost of compliance.
If a polluter controls more emissions than specified in the standard, it
can apply for certification of the excess control which is known as an emission
reduction credit. Sources are then allowed to use their credits to meet their
effluent standards at other discharge points or to sell them to other firms. A
firm which faces a higher cost of dean-up will purchase emission reduction
credits, in effect paying the selling finn to do the clean-up for them. Such
trades are regulated by region in order to make sure air quality is not
diminished in particular areas. Finns who are able to control pollution at a
lower cost will have an incentive to do so in this system due to the expected
profits from the sale of the credits. 68 Because emissions trading reduces the
cost of meeting the effluent standards, it reduces the likelihood that the
imposition of citizen suits could promote inefficiency. Therefore, standards
like those under the Clean Water Act can be remodeled in order to effectively
provide for efficient pollution control.
Comparative Enforcement Actions
Since different types of enforcement action can be taken against the
polluter, the ramifications of each must be discussed in order to detennine
whether citizen suits lead to greater efficiency in the system. Government

68 Tietenbe.rg, 345-354.
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agencies and citizen groups can file suit against a violating industry and settle
by means of a consent agreement. This is a negotiated settlement agreed to by
both sides which stipulates injunctions, compliance schedules and/or civil
penalties. With a negotiated settlement the citizen group or govemment
agency will seek to cover the social costs of pollution while the alleged
violator will be attempting to minimize transaction costs by settling out of
court. While minimizing transaction costs, if the consent agreement or
negotiated settlement also maximizes net social benefits and minimizes net
social cost, an efficient solution is likely to result. However, unfortunately
this is not normally the case.
If the problem cannot be settled through negotiation, judicial action is
required. Federal and state agencies can initiate both civil and criminal
actions. For the sake of efficiency, the power to apply criminal sanctions is
important because it prOvides strong incentives against gross violations of the
standards. Citizen groups can only initiate civil actions. The distinction
between the remedies available to public and private enforcement is
important not only because it demonstrates their non-substitutability, but
because under particular circumstances govemment enforcement will
obviously be more efficient. Assuming citizen suits preclude criminal action
it would not be efficient to allow citizens to take civil suits against gross
violators of the environmental standards due to the fact that they would lead
to an inefficiently low level of precaution on behalf of the regulated
industries. Industries should recognize that criminal violations will bring
criminal sanctions; they should not be allowed to perceive that criminal
sanctions can be escaped through citizen suits.
A criminal penalty is sometimes warranted in order to bring about the
proper incentives. First of all, because criminal penalties are not insurable,
60

finns have a greater incentive to prevent criminal violations. Secondly, if a
N

finn goes bankrupt and are thus rendered "judgement proof they may be
,

able to escape civil sanctions. Of the 507 settlements recorded in the citizen
suit database}' 9 firms were able to escape civil sanctions due to their
declaration of bankruptcy. However}' with criminal sanctions the officers or
employers still face jail sentences providing incentives to take precaution
which othetwise wouldn't take place under a civil sanction.
Under all other circumstances besides criminal violations, the simple
model provided above would lead one to believe that civil action by citizens
and agencies are interchangeable. However, in analyzing the citizen suit
provisions more closely it is obvious that there are some discrepancies
between the two. The provisions within citizen suits also effect their ability
to lead to efficiency.

Citizen Suit Provisions
The 60 Day Notice
The 60 day notice is required in order to: 1) allow the government to
take over enforcement, or 2) to allow the violator to clean-up and therefore
avoid going to court.

Is the 60 day notice requirement an efficient

improvement?
The main reason for the notice is to goad the govemment into action
by letting them know that the citizens intend to take action if the govemment
does not. In tenns of notification to govemment, it is important to consider
who is better able to bear the costs of bringing suit in order to determine if the
requirement is efficient. Efficiency requires that marginal cost
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=

marginal

benefit. Therefore, if the govemment agency has superior knowledge and
resources in a particular case, it is more efficient for them to be given the
power to take over enforcement action. On the other hand, if the citizen
organization has superior knowledge and resources they should be able to
continue with enforcement action. Thus, the allowance of a 60 day notice
period seems efficient in that it allows the federal govemment to weigh the
costs and benefits of taking over a suit and to do so if they are best suited.
This provision does not create an efficient solution, however, if the
govenunent decides to take over the suit because of political pressure. In this
case, efficient pollution control may not result if the govemment remedy is
less than that imposed by citizens. However, if the government does not
demonstrate diligent enforcement action, the citizen suit may be allowed to
proceed. This helps prevent the govemment from taking over a suit, only to
put it on the back burner and delay taking action. Therefore, in order for
efficiency to prevail, the party who can litigate at the lowest cost and who has
the best knowledge and resources must be allowed to do so. It seems that the
60 day notice requirement promotes efficiency in this respect.
The 60 day notice to defendants is a separate issue. In most cases due to
the Supreme Court decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
Fdn. Inc. , citizens are only allowed to sue for ongOing or intermittent

violations. Therefore, if the firm comes into compliance within the 60 day
period, the citizen is barred from taking suit unless the violation is likely to
occur again. On the one hand this seems to bring about an efficient solution
because the desired result, compliance, is achieved without lengthy and
expensive court proceedings. However, because it is more costly for some of
the industries to meet standards, they may have an incentive to pollute or to
neglect standards until they are given notice of a citizen suit and only then
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will they come into compliance. This leads the finn to take an inefficient
level of precaution due to the fact that they delay taking action. Therefore, a
more efficient solution may allow for the 60 day notice to defendants but
stipulate a penalty system in which the firm can avoid extremely high court
costs by coming into compliance within the 60 day period, but will face a
penalty for the damages caused prior to compliance. This would create a
higher level of precaution and lead to greater efficiency overall.
In order for the 60 day notice requirement to be efficient it seems that
the following objectives must be met:

1) the notice to government

requirement leads to a situation in which the party who is better able to bear
the burden of suit will do so and 2) the notice to the alleged violator allows
them a chance to avoid the high costs of court proceedings by coming into
compliance, but does institute a civil penalty for the violations previous to
compliance. The penalty would have to be less than the court costs, but high
enough to increase their level of precaution.

The Preemption Provision
The provision allowing "action in court" to bar citizen suits is a
controversial one because it is unclear whether Congress intended only
judicial action to bar citizen suits or whether they intended that
administrative action would bar a suit as well. In Baughman v. BradFord
Coal Co. the third circuit found that:

"...administrative enforcement bodies should be considered
'courts/ For the purpose of citizen suit sections if the /powers and
characteristics' of those bodies 'make such a classification
necessary to achieve statutory goals."(,9

69Jeffrey G. Miller, "Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws-Part II"
Environmental Law Reporter 14 (984),p.10069.
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Therefore, the court set out to detennine whether the administrative
powers in the particular case were comparable to judicial powers. In the

Baughman case the court found that under the Clean Air Act Section 304,
judicial authority can require compliance through an injunction and can
assess civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day. Citizens can intervene in these
proceedings. Administrative powers, on the other hand, authorized an
injunction, but the penalty assessment capability was lower, allowing
assessment of $10,000 per violation and 2,500 per day of violation.
Furthennore, citizens cannot intervene in these proceedings.70
Although a discrepancy in remedies and intervention exists among the
various decisions, most cases have found that administrative actions may be
considered court actions in order to bar citizen suits.
Is it efficient to allow govemment administrative action to bar citizen
suits? If we allow citizen suits to proceed even though the government is
taking administrative action, we may see duplication of enforcement efforts
which would be inefficient. If the government is reaching the desired result
through administrative action, it is more efficient for the citizen
organizations to spend their time and resources investigating other
violations rather than acting on the same violation as the govemment. Also,
if industry perceives that administrative actions do not bar citizen suits, they
may be hesitant to cooperate with the government in administrative
proceedings if they face the possibility of a costly court case as well. 71
Since allowing citizen suits could cause overcrowding in the courts and
high litigation costs, it is important to avoid court proceedings when

70Miller [I, p.l0069.
71Theodore L Garrett "Pros and Cons of Citizen Enforcement." Environmental Law Reporter 16

(986), p.l0162.
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enforcement objectives can be met in less costly ways.

In many cases

important objectives can be achieved at a lower cost through settling out of
court or through administrative action. Administrative action also solves
the problem of excessive litigation. The govemment, in most cases prefers to
proceed administratively first because it is a cheaper method of
enforcement. 72 Thus, it would seem efficient for administrative action by
government to preclude citi2en suits. The main goal of the suits is to bring a
violating industry into compliance, and if the govemment can do so at a
lower cost in and administrative forum, then it is efficient for citizens to let
them. One must recognize, however, that administrative actions cannot seek
penalties as high as those in judicial actions. In some cases it will be more
efficient to proceed judicially in order to assess a higher penalty for a strong
violation of a standard and therefore to induce regulated industries to take a
more efficient level of precaution.
Citizen Intervention
While citizens are barred from initiating a suit when a judicial or
administrative action has been initiated, they are not barred from intervening
in those proceedings. A number of environmental statutes permit citizen
intervention in govemment initiated actions filed in federal court. They also
allow the U.S. to intervene in all citizen suits. Although citizen intervention
is allowed in federal courts, in many cases it is not allowed in state courts.
The intervention provisions were meant to allow citizens barred from suit
due to government action, to participate in the enforcement process. Omens
can receive attorney fee reimbursement for intervention if their intervention
72 Elliot E. Polebaum and Mathew D. Slater; "Preclusion of Citizen Environmental Enforcement
Utigation by Agency Action,," Environmental Law Reporter 16 (1986), 10017.
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provides unique and useful infonnation to the case. Citizens and citizen
groups can intelVene in federal judicial enforcement at any time during the
case, this seems efficient in that it allows all relevant infonnation to be
provided.
However, in many cases citizens are not allowed intelVention in
administrative proceedings even though such proceedings can bar a citizen
suit. It is true that allowing citizen intervention in an open court cases is
easier and cheaper than providing a place for the citizen intelVener within
the closed negotiations involved with out of court settlement.

Perhaps

allowing for one member of the citizen organization to be involved in the
administrative negotiations would be the cheapest and most efficient
solution. If the costs of allowing one member of a citizen organization to be
present at the administrative negotiations, added to the rest of the
administrative costs, are less than the costs of a judicial hearing, and the
desired result is being achievecL then this would seem to be a more efficient
solution. In this case the representative of the citizen organization is able to
make sure the required objectives are being met to the citizen1s satisfaction,
and to present any infonnation which the citizen organization feels is
relevant to the case at hand.
Remedies
While some statutes allow citizens to sue for injunctive relief alone,
others allow for injunctive relief as well as the assessment of civil penalties.
The controversy over whether an injunction and penalties can be assessed
only against ongoing violations or if they can he assessed against past or
intermittent violations was mentioned in an earlier section.
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Not allowing an injunction or civil penalties for an action which
occurred in the past would diminish the incentive for citizens to research or
take action for single or repeated past wrongs if they know that they have no
remedies available. If the companies do not perceive a threat of government
enforcement and are able to clean up within 60 days, preventing citi.2en suits
against past violations will cause no change in the amount of precaution
taken by the finn due to the fact that it is cost effective for them to wait for the
notice of suit and then clean up.

Therefore penalties available only for

ongoing violations will allow regulated industry to minimize cash outlays
and financial liability by refusing to comply until the 60 day notice is filed.
However, allOwing citizens to sue for solely past violations may also create a
different set of priorities. The purpose of citizen suits is not to redress past
violations but to stop present violations.

Therefore, some sort of

compromise is necessary in order to achieve efficiency.
The court decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Fdn.
which allows the assessment of civil penalties for violations which are
ongoing or have occurred intermittently and are likely to occur again in the
future seems the most efficient.

This decision prevents citizens from

focussing their time on redressing past violations, and instead allows them to
focus on present endangerments. At the same time this creates incentives for
the companies to take greater precautions, while making sure the courts
aren't bombarded with cases against one-time violators.

Attorney Fee Reimbursement
The reimbursement of attorney fees to successful or partially successful
plaintiffs has important implications in relation to efficiency. First of all, the
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citizen can balance the benefits and costs of taking suit, and will have a greater
incentive to take suits which benefit the entire public if their attorney fees are
reimbursed. TItis decreases costs substantially and helps the environmental
group balance the costs and benefits of litigative activity. Noncomplymg
finns can avoid paying these costs simply by complying. Therefore, by
reducing the burden on public interest plaintiffs courts can lessen the
disincentives that a private individual faces when acting to protect interests
broader than self-interest,73 Congress recognized the fmandal barriers which
prevented the effective use of citizen suits and therefore authorized attorney
fee shifting.
If the plaintiff is awarded court costs, the defendant is responsible for

paying them. The defendant faces the threat of extremely high court costs
which they must bear if they lose the case and this may provide significant
deterrence in itself. In tenns of efficiency the attorney fee provision provides
the correct incentives.
Burden of Proof
As stated in an earlier section, the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) under the Clean Water Act requires finns to
fIle discharge monitoring reports (D MRs) at EPA.74 The Act states that:

"...the Administrator shall require owner to maintain such
records" make such reports" and provide such inFormation to
enable him to determine whether such owner has acted or is

73 Robert V. Percival and Geoffrey P. Miller, ''The Role of Attomey Fee Shifting in Public
Interest Litigation", Law and ContemponUy hoblems (1984), 137.
74 David Allan Feller, "Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws Through Citizen
Suits: A Model", Denver Law Journal, 60 no. 4 (1983); 566.
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acting in compliance with this part and regulations
thereunder. 1/75
The availability of D MRs is very important in allowing the efficient
use of citizen suits. The Act also requires that:
I~y inFormation

obtained under this section shall be available
to the public unless it divulges methods or processes entitled to
protection as trade secrets. "76
Therefore, citizens have access to these reports and use them in deciding
which finns have most flagrantly violated the statutes and therefore desenre
immediate enforcement action. The public availability of such infonnation is
also required under the other most frequently cited statutes: ReRA section
6972, and CERCLA section 6904.

These statutes state that an EPA

representative and a representative of the President respectively have the
power to determine the amount of monitoring which will take place.
Monitoring, therefore, is not as consistent as the NPDES system under the
Oean Water Act. The RCRA reports are harder to use as evidence than the
reports under CWA due to their complexity and the fact that they do not
clearly state whether the finn is or isn't in compliance. Also information
contained in RCRA and CERCLA reports may be deemed confidential and in
that case public access is prevented. The RCRA reports do offer citizens an
opportunity to prove violation but not with the ease they have under
CW A 77.

Most other environmental statutes provide for some sort of

monitoring as well. The courts have accepted the Discharge Monitoring

75 33 USC 1314.
76 33 USC 1314
77 Adeeb Fadil, NCitizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking up the Pac~ Harvard Environmental
Law Revimv, 9 no. 1 (1985); 68-69.
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Reports as proof of violations in citi2en suits. 78 Therefore the burden of
l

proof for citizens is quite straightforward.
There are obviously many aspects which create and effect efficiency. In
the case of citizen suits as long as the standards are efficient and the
l

govemment is not in a better position to take suit, citi2en suits can lead to
greater efficiency. The citizen suit provisions do create a barrier between
public and private enforcement in tenns of the 60 day notice and preemption
l

provision this barrier is efficient because it will prevent duplication of
l

enforcement while at the same time it allows the government to take an
enforcement action if they are in a better position to do so. On the other hand
the discrepancy in intelVention procedures is not efficient. Finally, the
penalty provision attomey fee reimbursement, and availability of discharge
l

monitoring reports help environmental groups balance the costs and benefits
of litigation and lead to greater efficiency in the system.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
Recognizably, citizen suits were created during the 1970·s to
complement public environmental enforcement in correcting market
failures. DUring the course of this project a number of implications have
emerged regarding the causes and consequences of citizen suits.
If govemment action is complete aU polluters would be in compliance
l

and citi2en suits would have no role to play. A corollary suggests that public
and private enforcement are inversely related. As the data show in the early
l

78 See Student Public Interest Research Group v. Fritzseh, Dodge & Olcott, Inc. S7'9 F. Supp at
1538.
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1980's when public enforcement decreased private enforcement - citizen suits
- increased. Lax public enforcement appears to have played a role in the rise
of citizen suits.
The analysis also shows that the available remedies have also played a
role. Although most statutes provide for an injunction

remedy~

those which

allow civil penalties represent a higher benefit to citizen organi2ations due to
their greater deterrence value.
statutes which allow

penalties~

CWA~ RCRA~

CERCLA and EPCRA the

were the the three most frequently cited

statutes in the citizen suit data. While in some cases penalties are directed to
the U.s.

Treasury~

they have often been eannarked to environmental funds

which are dedicated to the clean-up of the area at stake. Earmarking also
increases the benefit to the citizen group undertaking litigation activity.
The reimbursement of attorneys fees can also affect the level and focus
of litigation actively. Because fees are reimbursed for "appropriate" actions,
citizen suit costs are decreased and citizen organizations are allowed to
participate far more often in the enforcement process than they othetwise
would have been able. Since courts do not reimburse for inappropriate
actions, citizen groups are encouraged to litigate only appropriate cases. The
fact that attomey fees are routinely reimbursed under federal statutes but not
under state statutes is one apparent explanation for why suits under federal
statutes are so much more common.
The limitations placed on citizen suits have an ambiguous effect on the
process. The 60 day notice and 4S day review provisions have the potential to
either increase or decrease the costs and benefits of enforcement action. The
results rely heavily on the circumstances which surround the particular case.
Finally, citizen suit can be settled out of court and result in the
fonnation of a consent agreement or informal negotiated settlement. While
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out-of-court settlements involve lower costs compared to court proceedings

l

they also represent lower benefits due to the fact that judicial action is
perceived to create greater deterrence. Court precedents cany heavier weight
in resolving future conflicts.
Citizen suits also affect the decision-making process of the firm. The
different types of enforcement available affect the amount of precaution and
l

thus pollution controt taken by the firm. Firms weigh the expected penalty
against the cost of precaution in determining the equilibrium level of
precaution to be taken.
The addition of citizen suits to the enforcement arena increases the
expected penalty to the non-complying finn. It does this by increasing the
likelihood that the firm will face an enforcement action. While this can be
expected to increase the amount of precaution taken by the firm the
l

unavailability of compliance data makes it impossible to confinn this
expectation. Interviews with participants confirm that they believe increased
compliance is occurring.
The remedies can also affect the amount of precaution taken by
regulated industry'. Non-complying firms which face suit under statutes
which allow an injunction and penalties are likely to take more precaution
than firms that face suit under a statute which only allows an injunction

l

simply because they face higher expected penalties.
Finns facing an injunction and penalties for ongoing or intermittent
violations are also more likely to take more precaution than if they only face
an injunction and penalties for ongoing harm. Once again this is because of
the higher expected penalty resulting from the allowance of penalty
assessments against past intennittent harms.
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"

The availability of attorney fee reimbursement also affects polluter
incentives. An unsuccessful defendant not only has to pay its own attorney
fees, but also the reasonable attorney fees of the plaintiff.

Also, the

availability of attorney fees suggests that citizen groups will be able to
undertake more enforcement activity because it will allow their litigation
resources to be stretched further. These factors also increase the expected
penalty of the fum and therefore can be expected to lead to greater pollution
control.
Determining that citizen suits lead to greater enforcement does not
necessarily indicate that they lead to efficiency. Complete compliance is not
necessarily efficient if the target polluters face inefficiently harsh standards. A
number of other factors must be considered in determining whether citizen
suits lead to efficiency in the enforcement system.
Without any environmental enforcement, finns would not take into
account the social costs of pollution. The absence of enforcement would not
produce an efficient amount of pollution controL
Whether citizen suits lead to greater efficiency depends crucially on
whether or not the standards themselves are efficient. If the standards are
excessively high, citizen suits have the potential to promote inefficiency by
creating over-enforcement. However, if the standards are too low or correct,
citizen suits have the ability to create an efficient solution.
In looking at the comparative enforcement mechanisms, it seems obvious
that under particular circumstances citizen suits are not the most efficient
solution. Although citizen suits enhance enforcement, they are not perfect
substitutes for govemment action. The 60 day notice and preemption provisions
place citizen suits a step below govemment enforcement power. This is not
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necessarily inefficient unless the government preempts a suit for improper or
political reasons and then does not provide the efficient amount of enforcement.
The provision which allows citizen intelVention helps create greater
efficiency in the judicial setting, however, since intelVention is not allowed
in administrative actions an inefficiency results.
It is obvious that some aspects of citizen suits lead to efficiency and some

do not. By creating greater substitutability we could create greater efficiency.

Proposals for Change
Although citizen suits are obviously becoming a Significant force in
environmental enforcement, changes can be made to make the system work
more fluently and efficiently.
On an overall level, a new focus on the environmental statutes must be
made. Efficient pollution control cannot be expected unless the statutes promote
such actions. Some regulatory programs need to be updated in order to allow
Hnns to meet the requirements cost-effectively. These changes should follow
efficient models like that of the emissions trading program under the Clean Air
Act which provides a cost-effective way for polluters to meet the requirements of
the statutes efficiently. Only with efficient standards can citizen suits be
guaranteed to promote greater efficiency in the system.
The provisions surrounding citizen suits can also be amended for the sake
of efficiency. Citizen suits are not perlect substitutes for govemment
enforcement. In many cases, to provide the correct incentives to polluters it is
important that all enforcement mechanisms are afforded the same remedies.
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Penalty Remedy
The high level of success for citizen suits under statutes which allow the
assessment of civil penalties suggests that this provision should be extended to
other environmental statutes. Since the government can assess penalties under
all circumstances, the citizen suit sections which do not allow penalties should
be amended to include such provisions. Greater substitutability between public
and private enforcement would prevent any bias towards actions under statutes
which allow a penalty remedy.

Intenrention
Citizens can be barred from taking suit if the government has initiated
judicial or administrative action. The inconsistency rests in the fact that they are
only afforded intelVention rights in judicial proceedings. If they can be barred
from both, they should be able to intelVene in both. This way all relevant
infonnation available will be provided in any case.
For some cases it is more efficient for the government to take suit while
for other cases it is more efficient for citizens to sue. Some of the changes
specified above will allow the two methods of enforcement to become more
interchangeable.
Overall, citizen suits have played a distinct and important role in
environmental enforcement since the early 1980'5. They are obviously creating
greater enforcement, and in many, probably most, cases grea ter efficiency. The
refmements specified above would help promote even greater and more efficient
pollution control in the years to come.
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